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Commentators have observed how neoliberal capitalism – contrary to the official narrative - 
frequently correlates with enthusiastic bureaucratisation, and perhaps has done so from its 
inception. Despite this acknowledgement, the precise mechanisms involved remain obscure. 
Focusing mainly on the writings of F.A Hayek, I argue that economic libertarianism is often 
contingent on a particular spirit of administration, justification for which can be found in the 
‘fine print’ of Hayek among others. Furthermore, this counterintuitive symbiosis is realised 
through three institutional mechanisms, fuelling bureaucratisation in ostensibly pro-market 
environments. I discuss these mechanisms before exploring the implications they have for 
opposing the present economic regime.  
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I. 
One of the more noticeable contradictions between the avowed ideals of neoliberalism and its 
practical application in society is the persistence of bureaucracy. Of course, neoliberal thought 
(as articulated by an unending phalanx of theoreticians, policy analysts and politicians over the 
last forty years) is not a homogeneous discourse.1 Nevertheless, there is perhaps one theme that 
does unite F.A Hayek, George Stigler, Milton Friedman, James M. Buchanan and the so-called 
Chicago School: their hatred of bureaucracy. The vapid bureaucrat, who is normally conflated 
with ‘big government’ and its ready-supply of paperwork, is said to thwart entrepreneurship 
and the spontaneous order of the marketplace. Any well-functioning capitalist economy should 
therefore keep their numbers to a bare minimum.  
And yet there’s an elephant in the room.  
Even a cursory glance at societies that have undergone neoliberalisation show them replete 
with formidable bureaucracies, in both the public and private sector. We could demonstrate 
this quantitatively, using civil service spending data, for example, as a proxy for governmental 
administration. Statistics concerning the consolidation of capital into ‘super-companies’ tell a 




figures are important for gauging its scope today, the qualitative nature of bureaucratisation 
must be considered also. Whether numerically big or small, I propose, bureaucracy has thrived 
under neoliberalism - even as it enters into crisis - for one basic reason: to defend and advance 
the interests of the business elite, often assuming a punitive stance to do so. It’s the penalising 
tone that makes the qualitative difference, accentuating the feeling that we’re being constantly 
regulated by heartless functionaries, despite the ongoing evisceration of social services and the 
welfare state. Small can sometimes mean ‘big’ in this respect.   
The disconnect between the idealisation of deregulated capitalism and the goliath-like 
administrations surrounding us today is striking and worthy of careful explanation. Towards 
this end, David Graeber posits the ‘iron law of liberalism’, arguing that ‘financialisation, 
violence, technology [and the] fusion of public and private’ links the double-truth of market 
worship on the one hand and ‘total bureaucratisation’ on the other.2 According to Béatrice 
Hibou, bureaucracy in the neoliberal age follows the disciplinary formalisation of everyday 
life.3  
Graeber and Hibou’s observations are useful but remain vague about the exact mechanisms 
involved. It’s not enough to simply say that markets require top-down orchestration, 
particularly given how economic libertarianism and big bureaucracies are officially meant to 
be miles apart. Hence the purpose of this paper. As a mode of economic governance, 
neoliberalism is reliant on a certain spirt of bureaucratisation. We can identify signs of this in 
the ‘fine print’ of the theory itself (qualifications concerning corporate monopolies, an intrusive 
administrative state, etc.) and the obvious institutional requirements that its practical realisation 
necessitates in the social domain. I want to go further, however. What are the exact mechanisms 
that marry the ostensibly opposing logics of neoliberal reason and bureaucracy today? Three 
will be discussed: a) the concentration/centralisation of corporate and finance capital, b) the 
erosion of labour’s position of power vis-à-vis employers and c) the reformulation of statecraft 
into a conspicuously repressive process, typically in the name of economic discipline.         
II.   
As Max Weber showed, modern bureaucracy emerged in several locations around Europe in 
the late 18th Century, modelled after the Chinese system.4 Boiled down to its essential 
components, bureaucracy differs from previous types of administration (e.g., prebendal custom 
and patronage, kadi-justice, etc.) given the unusual formalism it exhibits. This stems from the 




minimisation of favouritism via the Tacitean code of sine ira et studio (‘without anger or 
fondness’).5  
Weber viewed the spread of bureaucracy as inevitable given its superior efficiency and 
planning capabilities, both in business and government. But he was famously ambivalent about 
whether that was a good thing. Regardless, it wasn’t long before bureaucracy was being 
criticised from all sides for it dehumanising effects. Sure, soviet communism was a major 
target, but plenty of attention was paid to capitalist societies too. Left-wing thinkers like C. 
Wright Mills, Herbert Marcuse and Ivan Illich inveighed bureaucracy from this perspective.6 
They uncovered its connexion with class control in the post-war period, where ‘domination is 
transfigured into administration’.7 
Criticisms by right-wing neoclassicists are of more interest to us since they were central to the 
restitution of laissez faire capitalism from the 1980s onwards. Although by no means 
homogeneous or without disagreement, an almost mythic distrust of the state is a common 
denominator in this intellectual tradition. The state meant many things to F.A Hayek, Frank 
Knight, Milton Friedman, George Stigler and Gary Becker inter alia, but a centralised 
bureaucratic complex was first and foremost.  
So what is neoliberalism? David Harvey defines it as follows: 
 Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
 proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
 entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by 
 strong private property rights, free markets and free trade… if markets do not exist (in 
 areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental 
 pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks 
 the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept 
 to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess 
 enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful 
 interest groups will surely distort and bias state interventions (particularly in 
 democracies) for their own benefit.8                     
The state is prominent in this definition, but principally as a negation.9 By default, the market 
stands for ‘the nonstate’ and vice versa, a rather simplistic dualism for sure given how 




Neoliberal theoreticians conflated bureaucracy with the state for several reasons. Despite 
examining business administration in detail, Weber’s main inspiration was the Prusso-German 
civil service. The consequences that bureaucratisation had for mass democracy also 
preoccupied his thinking. Moreover, Weber’s influential student Robert Michel’s used political 
parties to illustrate his ‘iron law of oligarchy’, claiming that even the most democratic 
organisations will develop an insulated and autocratic apex. This cynical view no doubt 
influenced Public Choice Theory as well, a branch of neoclassical economics (e.g., William 
Niskanen, James M. Buchanan, etc.) that views government officials as selfish rent-seekers. 
Finally, we shouldn’t omit the spectre of Soviet communism in compounding these 
unsympathetic views. 
At any rate, this state-phobia effortlessly transitions into a distrust of bureaucracy, constructing 
a zero-sum game between a) the innovative entrepreneur who creates wealth and jobs on the 
one hand and b) the obstructive government official who taxes them on the other. We could 
identify many examples to illustrate this ‘markets vs hierarchies’ dichotomy, but I’ll 
concentrate on F.A Hayek since his libertarianism is frequently read this way. Even though 
Hayek was never hired by the Chicago School of Economics (a professorship was created for 
him in the Committee of Social Thought in 1950) and he resisted the mathematisation that 
would later define neoclassicism, by the early 1980s followers and detractors alike believed he 
best summed up the intellectual arm of neoliberalism. But here’s the rub. Even in Hayek’s 
uncompromising stance, I argue, can be detected implicit qualifications and exceptions that are 
remarkably conducive to a certain variant of bureaucratisation in the public and private sphere. 
Furthermore, perhaps it is here that the intellectual roots of today’s authoritarian capitalism can 
be found too, suggesting not the demise of neoliberal doxa but a perverse and sometimes bizarre 
over-manifestation of it.      
III.  
The book that made Hayek famous, The Road to Serfdom, was published in 1944 with an 
abridged version appearing in the American magazine, Readers Digest. The book conveys 
many of the ideas he gleaned from his mentor Ludwig Von Mises, who himself penned a 
cantankerous tract about socialist governmentality called Bureaucracy in 1944.10 Hayek claims 
that the road to political backwardness is paved by central planning and state intervention in 
economic affairs. It wasn’t a wayward corporate sector that spawned totalitarianism – the 




among others - but collectivism per se.11 Therefore, even relatively liberal democratic 
sovereignties informed by Keynesian planning, for example, could easily slide in this direction 
according to Hayek. Whereas a society built almost entirely on an open marketplace permits 
businesses and individuals to voluntarily compete, requiring little central authority. The ‘price 
signal’ alone coordinates their activities, communicating information from innumerable actors 
in a spontaneous and non-coercive manner. What Hayek would later term catallaxy refers to, 
‘order brought about by the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a market’.12 
Government planners cannot achieve the same level of coordination due to their limited 
capacity to gather and process the necessary information.  
In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek treats bureaucracy as a synonym for state planning, 
diametrically opposed to private enterprise, which wilts under the yoke of centralised 
command: ‘where the scope of the political measures becomes so large that the necessary 
knowledge is almost exclusively possessed by the bureaucracy, the creative impulses of the 
private person must flag’.13 This gives state officials undue control over citizens and is 
anathema to personal liberty. An objection might be raised here, however, concerning unequal 
power relationships in the private sector, say between employer and employee. Aren’t they just 
as problematic? No says Hayek because workers are always free to quit: ‘who can seriously 
doubt that the power which a millionaire, who may be my employer, has over me is very much 
less than that which the smallest bureaucrat possesses who wields the coercive power of the 
state and on whose discretion it depends how I am allowed to live and work?’14 For Hayek 
writing in The Road to Serfdom, only a night watchman state ensuring basic rule of law is 
advisable in a free society.      
Here’s my basic argument. Hayek’s libertarian social philosophy will undergo substantial 
modifications and qualifications in the decades following The Road to Serfdom. For instance, 
his anti-state purism is quietly tempered in The Constitution of Liberty published in 1960. 
Governments are still the ultimate vehicle of bureaucratisation since they are primarily rule/law 
makers, necessitating administration and enforcement. But something strange also happens. In 
the ‘fine print’ of his discourse, Hayek quietly admits that a strong state is not always 
detrimental to commercial freedom. Neoclassical economists have been confused on this score 
according to Hayek, since the state can do much more than just safeguard law and order:  
 … it is the character rather than the volume of government activity that matters. A 




 are some other such activities by which its functioning will be assisted; and it can 
 tolerate many more, provided that they are of the kind that are compatible with a 
 functioning market.15  
Indeed, a ‘comparatively inactive’ state can be just as harmful as a tyrannical one in Hayek’s 
eyes. The criteria for differentiating between desirable and undesirable statecraft is coercion. 
Rules and policies that ‘assist’ and ‘service’ business activity (whether at the individual, 
corporate or industry level) are commendable. Those that force firms to act as they otherwise 
would have (particularly in the name of ‘distributive and social justice’) are lamentable because 
economic agency is stifled.16 It’s easy to see why Margret Thatcher reputedly fell in love with 
The Constitution of Liberty, even though she was probably more aligned with Milton 
Friedman’s monetarism. A new pragmatist tone enters Hayek’s theorising, albeit on the 
margins. To keep society on the true path a definite activation of the state is needed, no less 
intrusive than its Keynesian counterpart; one that defends business and chides welfare and 
unions; furthers free trade, maintains favourable conditions for entrepreneurship and so-on.  
This theoretical modification explains Hayek’s surprising sympathy for the economic 
federalisation of Europe, which would require central planning and administration in order to 
run smoothly. It’s the way governmental bureaucracy is used (flowing from Brussels as it 
would happen) that is decisive. As long as it promotes the free movement of capital, debt and 
labour, an integrated union would be commensurate with the tenets of neoliberalism.17 On a 
different – but as we’ll soon see, not necessarily disassociated – dimension, Hayek’s adulation 
for the Pinochet coup in Chile is also telling. The blending of free market reforms with tranny 
was ‘absolutely fantastic’.18   
The arguments in The Constitution of Liberty can therefore be distinguished from the anti-state 
zealots who emerged in Hayek’s wake, like Murray Rothbard and Anthony De Jasay. Nor was 
Hayek simply rehashing Wilhelm Röpke’s German Ordoliberalism (where state intervention is 
used to nurture free competition). This becomes apparent with some additional qualifications 
that Hayek makes apropos his earlier libertarianism, this time concerning corporate 
monopolies and their valorisation in neoclassical economics. The vacillation is fascinating 
because large company monopolies/oligopolies are notoriously bureaucratic and patently 
inimical to competition. While Hayek once eagerly supported the deconsolidation of big 
business, The Constitution of Liberty is more ambivalent. He begins by maintaining that labour 




to the latter, he ‘has become increasingly sceptical about the beneficial character of any 
discretionary action of government against particular monopolies, and I’m seriously alarmed 
by all policy aimed at limiting the size of enterprise’.19 For Hayek, it’s an ‘unpleasant fact of 
life’ that some private monopolies are unavoidable because they’re simply better than their 
competitors. Hayek then swiftly returns to the evils of trade associations, which for him are the 
real enemy, a perspective repeated twenty years later in the third volume of Law, Legislation 
and Liberty.20  
In summary, then, on the fringes of Hayek’s ultra-free market philosophy are certain 
qualifications and exceptions that subsequently allow the key benefactors of neoliberal 
capitalism to enjoy a number of notable antinomies, thus having their cake and eating it too. 
An imposing state apparatus, but one that mainly bolsters the interests of private enterprise. A 
society that venerates unregulated market competition and monetary individualism, but also 
permits large firms to dominate entire industries in energy, transport, defence, information 
technology and so-forth. Thus taking into account these escape clauses in Hayek’s writing, it’s 
not that surprising to see bureaucratisation thriving in the public and private sectors today.  
This makes the political Right’s continuing rally cry against bureaucracy even more 
disingenuous. Take the case of Steve Hilton, onetime advisor to former UK prime minster 
David Cameron and author of the best-selling tirade against bureaucracy, More Human.21 In 
his quest to rejuvenate Hayekian entrepreneurship in Britain, Hilton created the ‘red tape 
challenge’, which intended to rid 21,000 regulations from the economy, with paid maternity 
leave and building safety regulations at the top of the list. Hilton derided corporate monopolies 
too. They renounce the magic of competitive enterprise and cause widespread unhappiness. 
This is where left-wing critics get it wrong, according to Hilton. Capitalism isn’t the problem, 
‘it’s the transformation of business into bureaucracies, practically part of the government, 
writing their own laws, writing their own rules’.22 
Given the dispensations we have uncovered in the marginalia of F.A Hayek, Hilton’s plea 
appears to be peddling a kind of kindergarten version of neoliberalism. For sure, one wonders 
whether Hayek would be that perturbed by the trends Hilton disparages as unfaithful to the 
capitalist cause. Large government bureaucracies supporting the corporate sector, issuing tax 
cuts, vilifying unions and subsiding low-wage jobs? Bulky private monopolies and oligopolies 
controlling whole sectors of the economy, many of which were previously state owned? Rather 






Due to the messy socio-political conditions encountered on the ground, one reason why 
bureaucratisation is tacitly adumbrated in Hayekian thought comes down to pragmatic 
expediency. As long as the administrative machine is poised in favour of business, it’s 
acceptable. The assumption underwrites tendencies that exemplify how capitalism has evolved 
in recent times. These can be analysed with respect to three institutional mechanisms, all of 
which are coextensive with today’s burgeoning public and private bureaucracies.  
The first concerns the concentration/centralisation of corporate and finance capital, which in 
turn stimulates the growth of administrative systems relating to managerialism, regulated 
accumulation, contractualisation and so-on. We’re all familiar with the official narrative. An 
economy populated with freely competing private businesses, compelled to become efficient 
and responsive to customers, is infinitely more desirable that central planning by ‘big 
government’ and its throng of technocrats. As von Mises declared, the profit-motive keeps 
firms nimble while state bureaucracies display inertia: ‘no private enterprise will ever fall prey 
to bureaucratic methods of management if it is operated with the sole aim of making profit.’23 
The reality of neoliberal capitalism – from the 1980s onwards – has been very different. A 
prominent aspect of Western economies is the tremendous concentration (growth in the size of 
individual businesses) and centralisation (fewer players controlling specific industries) of 
capital. The concept of monopoly capitalism isn’t new, of course.24 But its reinvigoration by 
international financialisation is, where a semi-cartelisation process has created ‘super 
companies’ that dominate global markets, often in alliance with powerful state actors.25 
Research has found that 147 of the largest firms now control 40 per cent of the global wealth 
network.26 Another study focused on ‘waves’ of corporate amalgamation in the US economy 
since the 1880s. The latest wave (2000-present) is propelled by the deregulation of mergers 
and acquisitions and a fresh focus on international money markets (including ‘shadow 
banking’). The outcome is startling. There are about 5.7 million registered corporations in the 
US, but one-fifth of total assets are owned by only 100.27  
Monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies latent in capitalism gain momentum when business 
corporations are comparatively self-regulating and declining rates of return make competition 
undesirable. The consolidations that develop, however, don’t necessarily contradict 




the influence of Aaron Director (Head of the Chicago School of Law) and his criticism of 
antitrust legislation (i.e., the Sherman Act 1880 and Clayton Act 1914). Director convinced 
colleagues at the School of Economics that corporate syndicalisation is justifiable if it leads to 
socially beneficial outcomes. This explains why founding Chicago School economist Frank 
Knight subsequently complained that,  
 … the public has most exaggerated ideas of the scope of monopoly as really bad and 
 remediable, and talk of “abolishing” it is merely ignorant or irresponsible. There is no 
 clear line between legitimate and necessary profit and the monopoly gain that presents 
 a problem for action.’28  
Erstwhile defenders of antitrust legislation like Milton Friedman would soon see the light, 
chastising the US government’s attempt to break up Microsoft in the late 1990s (culminating 
with United States v Microsoft 2001). For Friedman, this discourages firms to be the best in 
their respective industries.29 Labour monopolies on the other hand were a totally different 
matter.30   
The link between corporate monopolies/oligopolies and bureaucratisation has long been noted, 
especially concerning the colossal conglomerations that characterised Fordism.31 Business 
historian Alfred Chandler claimed that if early US capitalism typified the ‘invisible hand’ of 
market pluralism (where small enterprises vie with each other in a Jacksonian milieu) then the 
20th Century was marked by a ‘visible hand’, with an army of bureaucrats running complex 
multiunit companies.32 The same applies today, albeit focused through the lens of 
neoliberalisation. For instance, business bureaucratisation is especially evident when large 
companies take over from where government left off as the public sector is pared-down and/or 
privatised.33 The provision of mass goods and services, especially when users are dependent 
on a provider, sees corporate administration truly bloom. This distinguishes firms that enjoy a 
monopoly in exclusive markets, say a luxury yacht manufacturer with a limited number of 
wealthy clients, from ones that control water and sewerage services in a metropolis like 
London. Here bureaucratisation reflects a) the size of operations (e.g., multiplying managerial 
hierarchies inside the firm), b) the need for legal-rational expertise pertaining to said operations 
(e.g., use of lawyers, tax accountants, contract and patent experts, etc.) and c) the technical 
challenges of extracting the greatest surpluses from dependent customers.  
But again, the number of bureaucrats tell us only half the story. The centralisation of corporate 




differences that override the volume involved. As F.A Hayek himself said, ‘character’ is of 
utmost importance. Three characteristics standout when it comes to neoliberal business 
administrations. The first pertains to supervision. As the rate of profit steadily declined between 
the 1970s and 1990s and then stagnated to the present, the internal administration of labour 
was intensified. Micromanagement was soon all the rage and unemployment the whip. Close 
quarters control of workers isn’t new either, but it took on fresh urgency following the collapse 
of the labour/capital compact during the Thatcher/Reagan period.34 After management gained 
the upper hand, seeking unit-labour cost efficiencies and extra effort, corporate bureaucracy 
took on the retributive flavour that is commonplace today (e.g., Human Resources, etc.).  
The second characteristic relates to regulating external stakeholders that present risks and 
opportunities to the monopolistic arrangement. Stakeholders include government 
policy/lawmakers, business partners and investors, lobbying organisations, disgruntled 
neighbourhood groups, shareholders and potential rivals. Moreover, legal and contractual 
services take on greater importance in these firms because of their market/industry dominance: 
competition and intellectual property law, litigation, mergers and acquisitions, compliance, tax 
liability strategies all need to be superintended by trained experts, either in house or through 
agencies.   
The third quality concerns the extractive relationship these corporate bureaucracies maintain 
with its captive customer-base. They’re designed to maximise exploitation (e.g., the use of 
penalty fees, measures to prevent goods and services entering the black market, 
disincentivising refunds, etc.), standardise the customer interaction process to save costs (e.g., 
automation, digital surveillance, etc.) and generate efficiencies that aren’t typically in the 
customer’s best interests (e.g., transferring labour costs onto customers, etc.). These 
bureaucracies are often predatory, incompetent and fairly irrational (think here of British rail 
or the US health insurance industry). The customer is nothing but an unending revenue stream 
irrespective of service quality. And because there is little recourse to public watchdogs, 
extractive bureaucracies are often experienced as being worse than their governmental 
equivalents.  
V. 
The second mechanism that imbricates bureaucratisation with the neoliberal project, 
interwoven with the first, can be found in the workplace. Namely, the erosion of labour’s 




employment sphere in the early 1980s, the post-war social compromise between capital and 
labour was still relatively intact. In the US this was supported by the 1935 Wager Act, 
protecting the right to unionise and bargain at the national level. Similar arrangements could 
be found throughout the Western world. As Fordism began to flounder, however, employers 
discovered a new vocabulary to weaken labour’s positional power. It sprung from the Chicago 
School and placed personal choice centre stage. Instead of employees having to conform to 
collective standards (e.g., regarding overtime, pensions, etc.) – often drafted and enforced by 
remote officials – they should be free to negotiate their own deals. Flexibility and individual 
preference were sold as ‘empowerment’ to workers, which US business gurus’ labelled 
‘liberation management’ in the 1990s, the arrival of a ‘free agent nation’.35  
Liberation management theorists repeatedly impugned bureaucracy.36 They claimed that 
Western capitalism was moribund because employers were tied to centralised agencies 
associated with the Wager Act, national union awards, labour arbitration courts, price controls, 
health and safety statutes, etc. Moreover, within firms themselves interminable red tape and 
pointless hierarchies had become a problem. Ford Motor Company was frequently cited as an 
example, which by the 1980s had managed to build twelve layers between executives and shop-
floor workers. All decisions were centralised and vertical lines of communication had virtually 
ground to a halt.37  
There’s no doubt that such bureaucracies were important for controlling the labour process. 
However, as Richard Edwards saw in the late 1970s when studying corporations like IBM, 
General Electric and Polaroid, the use of job descriptions, career paths and 
procedures/regulations was also an outcome of labour struggles against the arbitrary rule of 
capital.38 Bureaucratic control had unwittingly given employees access to a new lexicon of 
rights and entitlements, exposing their otherwise isolated workplaces to collective struggles 
unfolding at the national and international level. In other words, bureaucracy had inadvertently 
politicised the workplace and risked radically democratising it to boot.39  
With the elections of Ronald Reagan and Margret Thatcher, this never happened of course. 
Although the ‘war’ on bureaucracy was pitched as a push for improved individual freedom, it 
was obviously more about decollectivising the labour movement. Echoing F.A Hayek in 
particular (‘freedom is seriously threatened today by the tendency of the employed majority to 
impose their standards and views of life on the rest’), the employment relationship was 




employer behind shut doors, far away from the prying eyes of the state.40 Assisted by libertarian 
legalists like Richard A. Epstein, the proliferation of individual contracts was crucial to this 
decollectivisation process, which ironically bred its own impressive brand of (anti-collectivist) 
administration.41 
The result was not increased prosperity for workers but the opposite. The celebration of isolated 
individualism in the employment relationship eroded security and wage levels, with contingent 
jobs and casualisation a predictable corollary. So why didn’t bureaucracy disappear as 
predicted by neoliberal theory? An expression of administration actually did disappear, 
associated with the threat of mass democratisation that Richard Edwards mentioned. But it was 
swiftly rebuilt into a different sort of complex and a pretty nasty one at that. Labour economist 
David Gordon spotted early signs of this in the mid-1990s in his seminal study Fat and Mean.42 
With the advent of US neoliberalism, statistical evidence reveals that the number of bureaucrats 
noticeably grew in the private sector, even after overall employment growth is taken into 
account. In 1948 administrative/supervisory staff made up 12 per cent of the workforce. The 
figure was nearly 20 per cent by 1992.   
Yet again, the size of this bureaucracy isn’t the critical factor but its character when filtered 
through the prism of neoliberal reason. For example, take the attitude change that occurred 
when neoclassical economics was transposed into the workplace. Duff McDonald mentions 
this in his exposé of Harvard Business School and pernicious ideas like principle/agency theory 
that rose to prominence in the 1980s.43 Popularised by Chicago School-inspired business 
academics Michael Jensen and William Meckling, principle/agency theory was intended to 
predict management (mis)behaviour but was soon applied to everyone.44 Through this lens, 
‘agents’ (workers, managers and even CEOs) are pegged as inveterate cash-hunting 
opportunists who will shirk their duties whenever they can. Employers (or ‘principals’) turned 
to invasive micromanagement to deal with the perceived threat. 
In an ideological universe where shameless self-interest is king, this dark view of the workforce 
was probably inevitable. Paradoxically, it became especially evident when firms actually did 
try and adopt liberation management, trialling self-organising teams, decentralised decision-
making, flat structures and information sharing. A classic example was documented by 
Shoshana Zuboff in her study of industrial digitalisation.45 When a large paper mill installed a 
computerised cost-tracking system (called ETS), the data was initially open to all employees. 




impressive costs savings that accrued, management soon abandoned the policy and denied 
workers access to the information. Why so? They were afraid of what workers might do with 
the data: soon after, ‘an abrupt escalation of bureaucracy that surrounded the ETS’ ensued.46  
Two important points follow. First, since neoclassical economists tell us that organisational 
members (workers, managers, etc.) can never be trusted to behave dutifully, supervisory 
bureaucracies will automatically expand, even in a context of labour market deregulation. As 
David Gordon observed, ‘… who keeps the supervisors honest? What guarantees that those 
supervisors won’t be in cahoots with their charges? In such a hierarchy, you need supervisors 
to supervise supervisors… and the supervisors above them… and managers to watch the 
higher-level supervisors.’47  
But this propagation doesn’t take place in a vacuum, which brings us to the second point. What 
Gordon calls the ‘stick strategy’ of labour management mirrors the wider class structure, one 
that’s been significantly destabilised and polarised in favour of employers. This explains why 
corporate managers are willing to tolerate costly bureaucracies rather than let workers organise 
the labour process themselves. For neoliberalism isn’t simply an economic project, but a class 
one too and is happy to sacrifice efficiencies in order to keep that social relationship as one-
sided as possible. Hardnosed managerial bureaucracies are central to this.  
As the relationship between capital and labour becomes increasingly lopsided, conflict is more 
likely. Hence why precarious and casualised work arrangements – perhaps the hallmark of 
neoclassical employment policy – attract so much management, charged with keeping a lid on 
the discontent. A recent European study of 3000 firms in deregulated labour markets (where 
‘flexible’ jobs were extensively exploited) is telling in this respect. Given how workers are 
treated as independent contractors, it was assumed that employers would not need a great deal 
of administration. But that wasn’t so:  
 we find that organisations employing high shares of flexible workers have higher shares 
 of managers in their personnel… deregulated labour markets have thicker management 
 bureaucracies than countries with more regulated labour markets of the “Rhineland” 
 style. We argue that flexibility in labour markets (i.e. easier firing and higher labour 
 turnover) damages trust, loyalty and commitment. This requires more management and 
 control’.48  
The implicit motto of managerialism today is clear: you’re on your own (in terms of being 





The third mechanism pertains to the reorganisation of statecraft into a punitive process, one 
that tries to reconcile society with the partial interests of corporate and financial capital. The 
state didn’t radically withdraw following the revitalisation of market fundamentalism in the 
1980s, despite the ‘small government’ cant by Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and Milton 
Friedman. We instead witnessed a transformation of its modus operandi. As Duménil and Lévy 
explain regarding neoliberal governmentality in the 1980s, ‘the creation of the new context of 
neoliberal globalisation was part of the deliberate objective of the states, which mirror those of 
the classes they represent’.49  
However, we must go further because this was no ordinary recontextualisation. The state 
aggressively sought to undo the post-war compromise and de-democratise the public sphere, 
which was now impeding the capital accumulation process.50 Bureaucracy is an understandable 
go-to tool for pursuing this objective, be it for administering regressive taxation policies or 
regulating the working poor. Furthermore, the sovereign debt crises following the 2008 
financial meltdown provided an excellent cover-story for this predacious style of government, 
particularly in relation to welfare.51  
The reformulation of the neoliberal state into a protectorate of big business can be seen in 
public spending figures. Look at the US and UK, for example. In 1980 the US spent 36.0 per 
cent as share of national GDP.52 In 2010 the figure was 45.07 per cent. The UK spent 52.5 per 
cent of GDP in 1980. In 2010 the figure was 53.45 per cent.53 So where and how is the money 
spent? Certainly not on infrastructure, as crumbling bridges and sewers attest. Military 
expenditure is surely significant. But two spending targets standout. First, direct subsidies to 
private enterprise. For instance, it’s been calculated that in 2015 the UK government transferred 
£93 billion to the business sector in this way (including subsidies, grants and corporate tax 
rebates), which overshadowed corporate tax revenues.54 Second - and oddly for stereotypical 
neoliberal economies - social spending related to unemployment benefits, family support, 
accommodation subsidies, food stamps, etc. In the US this figure rose from 12.48 per cent (in 
1980) to nearly 20 per cent in 2010 and 15.54 per cent in the UK to 22.79 per cent in 2010.55  
Doesn’t this social spending defy the ‘no handout’ position of the austere neoliberal state? Not 




 there is little reason why government should not play some role, or even take the 
 initiative, in such areas as social insurance and education… our problem here is not so 
 much the aims but the methods of government action.56 
The methods he prefers, of course, are those that extend commoditisation, even if it means 
subsiding private firms to do so: ‘subsidies are a legitimate tool of policy, not as a means of 
income redistribution, only as a means for using the market to provide services’.57  
Let’s examine how this operates in Britain. Welfare spending subsidies the growing number of 
employers who refuse to pay a living wage in the fast food, service and retail sector, etc. For 
sure, UK workers born between 1981 and 2000 are now less-well off than old-age pensioners, 
and are the first generation to be poorer than their parents.58 The state bankrolls this income-
deficit so that ‘liberalised’ labour markets can continue unabated, costing £11 billion a year in 
tax credits and benefits.59 No wonder a soaring bureaucracy has emerged to manage these 
government programmes, manned by an army of officials who add insult to injury by 
monitoring its low-wage ‘clients’ and drowning them in senseless paperwork.60  
Nonetheless, it’s the character of this machinery rather than magnitude that matters. When it 
comes to the working poor and unemployed, the bureaucracies they encounter do not follow 
the dictum of ‘without regard to person’ that Max Weber spoke of, but are unusually vicious. 
Failed economic subjects – who are often the product of neoliberal policies – have to be 
punished in order for the credo of market individualism to appear credible. Treating them with 
compassion would imply there’s something wrong with the system rather than the individual. 
For example, it was recently discovered that UK Jobcentre staff receive ‘brownie points’ for 
being cruel to their clients, reprimanding them for minor infringements.61 Then there’s the 
notorious ‘Fit for Work’ scheme that medically reassesses ill beneficiaries with the aim of 
moving them back into the labour market. After being judged healthy enough, individuals 
receive a letter explaining why their payments will soon cease. An urgent appointment at the 
Jobcentre is then recommended (with calls costing £0.55 per minute, of course). In February 
2019 this happened to 46-year-old Stephen Smith from Liverpool. The only problem was he 
had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, osteoarthritis and used a colostomy bag. Incredibly, 
the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) still rejected his appeal. Smith took the case to 
a tribunal and after seeing his emaciated, six stone body the judge immediately found in his 




already dead. Between December 2011 and February 2014 around 2,380 people died after 
being found fit for work by the DWP.62      
Punitive state bureaucracies don’t simply reflect the elite’s distain for the poor. Two additional 
factors are at play. First, given widening class inequalities, the obscene redistribution of wealth 
to the rich and the social volatility that follows, it’s unsurprising that redoubled efforts around 
policing/regulation is a priority for governments.63 And no matter how much public money is 
spent, it can always be made compatible with neoliberalism’s ‘rule of law’ datum or what 
Hayek calls ‘limited security’, a sliding scale no doubt.64 Second, punitive bureaucracies 
convey a basic loathing of the public sphere. This is apparent in how its workers are treated. 
State organisations now behave like hungry business enterprises, exploiting their workers as 
private capital does theirs, deploying an array of metrics and key performance indicators to do 
so. A lot of bureaucracy is needed for this. Hence why the neoliberal university, for example, 
doesn’t conform to the ‘lean and mean’ cliché found in kindergarten evocations of neoclassical 
economics. Yes, they’ve been commercialised and exposed to market forces. But that’s actually 
made them fatter and mean, overcrowded with hostile administrators who generally despise 
academics, as the 2018 UK pensions dispute revealed.65 
Once again, it’s tempting to think that F.A Hayek would frown with disapproval if he could 
survey the immense state bureaucracies supporting (and acting like) the business world today. 
But realistically, he’d probably just shrug.            
VII.  
In summary, it appears that the abstractions of neoliberal orthodoxy cannot function in the real 
world without a certain mode of administration. The disjunction is quietly resolved in the 
writings of F.A Hayek inter alia. Certain provisos in an otherwise unyielding interpretation of 
market fundamentalism permits the presence of muscular business-centric states and vast 
corporate bureaucracies. I have also identified three mechanisms that realise this synthesis. In 
the business sphere, the centralisation and concentration of corporate and financial capital; in 
the employment sphere, the demise of the capital/labour compact and a renewed emphasis on 
bureaucratic hierarchies to control workers; and in the state sphere, public administration being 
recast as an punitive warden of society, managing the class antagonisms that arise when 
financial capitalism is handed the keys to the house.               
No doubt the term ‘neoliberalism’ is overused today. It is ascribed to anything negatively 




its star is now fading following Brexit and a resurgence in ethno-nationalism, which is 
debateable. Regardless, the effects of this economic doctrine are writ large almost everywhere 
and a specific style of bureaucratisation is chief among them. We can now appreciate how 
neoliberal praxis is fairly congruent with complex and overbearing administrative structures in 
the public and private sector. Rather than signalling a rejection of neoliberalism, perhaps the 
recent appearance of state-sponsored authoritarian capitalism is but an elaboration of the 
caveats buried deep in the works of F.A Hayek and fellow travellers. 
In light of our analysis, the classic Weberian demarcation between formal-instrumental 
rationality (Zweckrational or technical ‘means’) and substantive reason (Wertrational or value-
based ‘ends’) looks problematic.67 Bureaucracy under neoliberalism shouldn’t be viewed as a 
neutral machine that’s been hijacked by errant powerholders, since that would imply the same 
apparatuses could simply be attached to friendlier, more progressive governance strategies. But 
as Hayek intimates, the administrative means themselves undergo a qualitative transformation 
when charged with forceful political ends. I think this accounts for the highly normative and 
malign texture of the bureaucracies examined above (and we could add many other examples, 
including the intimidating ‘expulsive bureaucracies’ associated with immigration). Hardly 
paragons of neutrality and pretty much non-transferable to any future emancipatory 
undertaking. Therefore, successfully opposing the present economic regime will necessarily 
entail radically rethinking the daily means through which any coming polity is administered. 
Not only the ‘big picture’ but the smallest one too.     
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